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#21 mSparks

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Posted 05 August 2012 - 02:32 AM

http://www.whispersy...pen-source.html

#22 mSparks

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Posted 06 April 2014 - 02:50 AM

http://www.themobili...&doc_id=272626

100,000 units at $3,500 a pop.

nice.

#23 army_of_one

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Posted 07 April 2014 - 01:58 PM

Got an email on this thread. I got to look at my old statements, look at the results of Snowden leaks, and see how accurate/inaccurate they turned out. My old claims proved true over time. The NSA leaked TAO catalog showed they attack BIOS, peripheral firmware, emanations, crypto, base station layer, device drivers, privileged software, and regular apps. They also subvert the hell out of things at supplier level with bribes, coercion and infiltration. My requirement for high assurance (EAL6-7) at every layer, component, and interaction with independent evaluation by mutually suspicious parties and secure distribution is indeed necessary to stop (or slow) a TLA. Funny thing most projects reacting to NSA leaks are aiming for *much* less security or trusting complex lower layers already hacked. Such is a fool's game of building foundations on quicksand.

 

re Cryptophone

 

I talked to Frank Rieger, Cryptophone co-founder, on Schneier's blog years ago. I told him his phone was trivially hackable by an NSA type opponent despite his OS hardening because of lower layers and insecure architecture. I said he also couldn't prove to his users he didn't backdoor it, which had huge precedents (eg Crypto AG, Skype). As such, I told him he'd need ground up redesign to secure the architecture with independent evaluation that publishes the hash of the image, including software/firmware updates. Over time, they've added Android to the TCB and a mere "baseband firewall" for IO issues. (Rolls eyes...) My solution, which addressed various layers, had enough hardware to fill a brief case lol. At least the headset and keypad were light! A small, integrated version would require a custom ASIC with each component likely done fresh. ASIC's with proven components often cost $15-30 million to develop (mask alone is $2mil). Such is the cost and complexity of a nearly NSA-proof cell phone. Virtually every "secure" cellphone on the market shortcuts by using COTS, so my heuristic says they're *definitely* insecure. Secured cellphone would be bulky, more expensive than Cryptophone, subject to patent lawsuits, and probably still be vulnerable for EMSEC attacks. See General Dynamic's Sectera Edge for what it would look like far as size and trusted path interface. 

 

Situation looks dire for mobile COMSEC. My current scheme is to build a portable machine that other things, eg laptop or cell phone, can interface to. The common hardware uses best of breed security engineering to implement a MILS security model. The interfaces layer has much functionality, esp crypto, sealed in the hardware. So, the person pulls out their tiny smartphone, but it's really another device doing the work. The phone just has to securely connect to it, relay IO, and display something on a screen. Security requirements for that device should be small enough to allow high robustness. The *other* device will be bulkier and more complex, but it affords extra chips I need to use proven methods* maybe even in reusable way. Main board can be in briefcase, backpack, conference table, desk, car, etc. Whole thing would be expensive with the assurance activities and hardware. Hopefully, it can be under $10k. (Original briefcase model with medium assurance components & high assurance security kernel cost a few grand in hardware alone.) 

 

* Proven methods for nearly impenetrable systems include tagged memory, capabilities, smart IO processors with IOMMU, interrupt-less designs, non-writable firmware, small TCB, and default-deny control flow with access table for permissible function calls. Each of these already exist in a real product or design, past or present. Good news is much of it existed in old systems so it's consistent with my recent strategy of building modern system out of ultra-old shit to prevent patent-related takedown. Look up Burrough's B5000 libraries/HLLcode, IBM System/38 whole architecture, Hydra/CAP capability machines, GECOS's firmware approach, Intel's i432/i960MX designs, and so on. These each have some brilliant design decisions that make modern architecture look like shit from a security standpoint. However, the memory confidentiality and integrity schemes that prevent common physical attacks seem to be a modern invention almost certainly covered by patents. My first system will therefore assume physical security & trusted admin while aiming to defeat all remote, software or interface level attacks. Next system will do other stuff. 

 

My post on Schneier listing much of the best current security tech in case anyone wants to work on *real* security like the people in the paper (and myself) are doing: 

 

https://www.schneier...4.html#c2902272

 

I hope NSA leaks inspire more work on *real* full-system security instead of all the mental masturbation of finding 0-days, writing tons of unsafe code (eg C/C++) and putting more band-aid's on architectures not designed for security (eg UNIX model). But, hey, there's still billions to be made pushing or compromising bullshit security so why not. :)



#24 mSparks

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Posted 03 June 2014 - 04:16 AM

"NSA secure" doesn't mean security from the NSA installing custom kit in your hardware on it's way to you. Don't think there is anything you can do to stop that.

NSA secure is actually "privacy from Microsft, Google and the various encryption standard capture/decrypt on the wire" (is it still Phoenix Global that does the backend stuff or did they change their name?).

dropping through an insecure device somewhere along the line is unavoidable (short of your own hardware hardened darknet), so you just have to make sure the data is secured before it gets there. Fankly anything is better than the default situation which is anything and everything you put into google/microsoft software (or any of the new big providers) going straight for processing.

My point is the market is there, and it doesn't have to cost a small fortune for protection from the most ubiquitous evesdropping (anything that "breaks" the standard decryption protocols is enough).

Edited by mSparks, 03 June 2014 - 07:03 AM.


#25 mSparks

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Posted 28 December 2014 - 04:42 PM

yey

redphone makes the grade.
http://m.spiegel.de/.../a-1010361.html

#26 tekio

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Posted 28 December 2014 - 08:33 PM

not trolling here, but give me a scenario where i would need to use this, being a civilian.

https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying



#27 Zapperlink

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Posted 29 December 2014 - 04:36 PM

As a civilian it really depends. Is defining yourself as a civilian meaning you do not care about privacy or are you assessing your needs based on risk? One could say that everyone needs it as a baseline, because as technology evolves, the ability to add basic line of features is more and more possible, and now people are saying that it SHOULD be a baseline to have end to end call encryption. However does the average person actually carry a conversation that would be considered confidential enough to matter, not likely. I think the conversation opens up more as a standardization opportunity with the recent events of infrastructure security and spying.



#28 tekio

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Posted 30 December 2014 - 07:34 AM

As a civilian it really depends. Is defining yourself as a civilian meaning you do not care about privacy or are you assessing your needs based on risk? One could say that everyone needs it as a baseline, because as technology evolves, the ability to add basic line of features is more and more possible, and now people are saying that it SHOULD be a baseline to have end to end call encryption. However does the average person actually carry a conversation that would be considered confidential enough to matter, not likely. I think the conversation opens up more as a standardization opportunity with the recent events of infrastructure security and spying.

But what about the Obama administration and IRS targeting the Tea Party? Well, what if I'm a tea party supporter? All of a sudden the IRS could be paying particular attention to me just because I text/call my fellow Tea Party supporters. Maybe even, I end up getting pulled over all the time, screened by TSA, etc... Just because my name ends up on some government database as a "Tea Party supporter".

Or if somebody eaves dropping on my conversations just decides to make life difficult because they dislike my person beliefs for whatever reason? That's why its illegal and unconstitutional. However, that seems to no longer apply.



#29 Zapperlink

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Posted 30 December 2014 - 03:39 PM

 

As a civilian it really depends. Is defining yourself as a civilian meaning you do not care about privacy or are you assessing your needs based on risk? One could say that everyone needs it as a baseline, because as technology evolves, the ability to add basic line of features is more and more possible, and now people are saying that it SHOULD be a baseline to have end to end call encryption. However does the average person actually carry a conversation that would be considered confidential enough to matter, not likely. I think the conversation opens up more as a standardization opportunity with the recent events of infrastructure security and spying.

But what about the Obama administration and IRS targeting the Tea Party? Well, what if I'm a tea party supporter? All of a sudden the IRS could be paying particular attention to me just because I text/call my fellow Tea Party supporters. Maybe even, I end up getting pulled over all the time, screened by TSA, etc... Just because my name ends up on some government database as a "Tea Party supporter".

Or if somebody eaves dropping on my conversations just decides to make life difficult because they dislike my person beliefs for whatever reason? That's why its illegal and unconstitutional. However, that seems to no longer apply.

 

 

Well we can speculate scenarios of targeted attacks, but from the goal of information, who you call is already information obtained, what you do and say on that call is what I believe people generally want to protect. I could be entirely wrong from my perspective but the value of protecting communication technologies as a standard for both the citizen and the government should be just that, a standard, a minimum level of expectation of the devices leveraging the communication technologies.



#30 army_of_one

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Posted 30 December 2014 - 07:29 PM

@ SirAnonymous and all re privacy

 

I think Bruce Schneier wrote the definitive essay on this a while back. It might help you.

 

https://www.schneier...l_value_of.html

 

@ mSparks

 

Reports on those slides are misleading. RedPhone is strong enough to be immune to passive network surveillance. If you're not important, they don't see your communications. However, they have 0 days on Android. So, they hack Android and bypass RedPhone crypto. That's why I advocate a holistic approach. NSA and even sophisticated blackhats are targeting every level. Security is only as strong as the weakest link. So, each level must be protected and most current solutions don't do that.

 

I used to say "no FOSS has used high assurance methods." I make exception these days for one: Tinfoil Chat. Markus Ottela was one of the few to pay attention to the lessons others and I gave on high assurance (esp on Schneier's blog). His solution combined several strong techniques, from data diodes to my physical separation approach, into a novel solution that might be immune to remote attacks in a rigorous implementation. At my request, he also added a cascading cipher variant for practicality. The sooner people start applying proven methods, like he did, the sooner we'll have secure solutions to our problems. Still waiting on market and FOSS to get some sense. At least academia is building useful solutions: crash-safe.org processor, Cambrige CHERI processor, hardware CFI, CodeSEAL, and so on.



#31 tekio

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Posted 30 December 2014 - 07:44 PM

 

 

As a civilian it really depends. Is defining yourself as a civilian meaning you do not care about privacy or are you assessing your needs based on risk? One could say that everyone needs it as a baseline, because as technology evolves, the ability to add basic line of features is more and more possible, and now people are saying that it SHOULD be a baseline to have end to end call encryption. However does the average person actually carry a conversation that would be considered confidential enough to matter, not likely. I think the conversation opens up more as a standardization opportunity with the recent events of infrastructure security and spying.

But what about the Obama administration and IRS targeting the Tea Party? Well, what if I'm a tea party supporter? All of a sudden the IRS could be paying particular attention to me just because I text/call my fellow Tea Party supporters. Maybe even, I end up getting pulled over all the time, screened by TSA, etc... Just because my name ends up on some government database as a "Tea Party supporter".

Or if somebody eaves dropping on my conversations just decides to make life difficult because they dislike my person beliefs for whatever reason? That's why its illegal and unconstitutional. However, that seems to no longer apply.

 

 

Well we can speculate scenarios of targeted attacks, but from the goal of information, who you call is already information obtained, what you do and say on that call is what I believe people generally want to protect. I could be entirely wrong from my perspective but the value of protecting communication technologies as a standard for both the citizen and the government should be just that, a standard, a minimum level of expectation of the devices leveraging the communication technologies.

 

I wasn't speculating much. I was giving examples of stuff that happens. Your claiming it doesn't is more speculative. Why would they illegally spy on average citizens? Because they have nothing better to do, but listen to random people talk about their grandkids? Behavior is motivated, and with a result in mind. That's basic physiology.

 

Why not encrypt communications? I don't know a lot about Edge, 4G, LTE, etc... But I'd guess they have and make use of an encryption standard. But its pretty much law that data providers need to build in access for federal law enforcement to access communications. 

 

What if you're randomly talking about BinRev? You could get flagged. Then one day decide to download something with questionable legality. Then get singled out because as far as the Feds are concerned you're a "hacker".

 

Just look at how many middle-eastern and Chinese citizens are wanting proxies, encryption applications to have some sense of privacy in their lives.

 

EDIT: Please don't try to take my comments that wrong way Zapperlink. I'm just debating my beliefs in the mater. Well... debating my opinion...  I think applications that allow end to end encryption are extemely useful for anybody. Not just James Bond.  

 

 

@ SirAnonymous and all re privacy

 

I think Bruce Schneier wrote the definitive essay on this a while back. It might help you.

 

https://www.schneier...l_value_of.html

 

@ mSparks

 

Reports on those slides are misleading. RedPhone is strong enough to be immune to passive network surveillance. If you're not important, they don't see your communications. However, they have 0 days on Android. So, they hack Android and bypass RedPhone crypto. That's why I advocate a holistic approach. NSA and even sophisticated blackhats are targeting every level. Security is only as strong as the weakest link. So, each level must be protected and most current solutions don't do that.

 

I used to say "no FOSS has used high assurance methods." I make exception these days for one: Tinfoil Chat. Markus Ottela was one of the few to pay attention to the lessons others and I gave on high assurance (esp on Schneier's blog). His solution combined several strong techniques, from data diodes to my physical separation approach, into a novel solution that might be immune to remote attacks in a rigorous implementation. At my request, he also added a cascading cipher variant for practicality. The sooner people start applying proven methods, like he did, the sooner we'll have secure solutions to our problems. Still waiting on market and FOSS to get some sense. At least academia is building useful solutions: crash-safe.org processor, Cambrige CHERI processor, hardware CFI, CodeSEAL, and so on.

 

I think the "hunt" for Osama Bin Ladin pretty much proves that if the U.S. Federal Government wants to spy, find, or eliminate you; there's nowhere in the world you can hide for very long. 

Even as good as a great encryption key is: the Federal government has pretty much unlimited resources for clustered super-computers and access to almost anything or anywhere (oh. we had stealth Black Hawk helicopters able to evade in airspace w/i a short distance of Pakistani Military facilities??? ;-)  )


Edited by tekio, 30 December 2014 - 07:54 PM.


#32 mSparks

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Posted 02 January 2015 - 11:35 PM

@ SirAnonymous and all re privacy

I think Bruce Schneier wrote the definitive essay on this a while back. It might help you.

https://www.schneier...l_value_of.html

@ mSparks

Reports on those slides are misleading. RedPhone is strong enough to be immune to passive network surveillance. If you're not important, they don't see your communications. However, they have 0 days on Android. So, they hack Android and bypass RedPhone crypto. That's why I advocate a holistic approach. NSA and even sophisticated blackhats are targeting every level. Security is only as strong as the weakest link. So, each level must be protected and most current solutions don't do that.

I used to say "no FOSS has used high assurance methods." I make exception these days for one: Tinfoil Chat. Markus Ottela was one of the few to pay attention to the lessons others and I gave on high assurance (esp on Schneier's blog). His solution combined several strong techniques, from data diodes to my physical separation approach, into a novel solution that might be immune to remote attacks in a rigorous implementation. At my request, he also added a cascading cipher variant for practicality. The sooner people start applying proven methods, like he did, the sooner we'll have secure solutions to our problems. Still waiting on market and FOSS to get some sense. At least academia is building useful solutions: crash-safe.org processor, Cambrige CHERI processor, hardware CFI, CodeSEAL, and so on.

not disagreeing with you exactly.
BUT
and it's a big but.

For a targeted attack they need to identify you -> passive surveillance.
For a targeted attack they need to identify the device you are using -> passive surveillance.
and
Once they have identified you and the device you are using, a targeted attack is trivial, no matter how secure the device.
Break passive surveillance and you also break 90% of their means to launch a targeted attack. (with the other 10% being already knowing who you are, such as via attending demonstrations and signing your real name on that petition the geeky kid was asking everyone to fill in)
OTOH, I'd say there is a lot of disinfo going round atm, rsa key exchange is still about as strong as feather duster
( http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/rsa/ ) (I was posting about this in 05.....)
Since I guess all this investment isn't really paying off, because everyone knows the security model is broken, and no one is using any mainstream app to post anything they can use as ammunition.
So I'd have to recommend a redphone fork, rather than the facebook backed version....

(also I see the rasberry pi has its own hwrng now, I might fit one to my server stack)

Edited by mSparks, 03 January 2015 - 06:08 AM.


#33 mSparks

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Posted 05 January 2015 - 09:39 AM



Why is a targeted trivial once they know who you are:
If they have a tuple of your device ID and your ID, and your device has any kind of RF emmission (i.e. not a hardwired, isolated device)
The cell towers will locate you.
And since you have no control over your environment (and virtually no protection against surveillance cams and laser mic's), once they can track your location it is straight forward to install really cheap equipment additional to your secure device to monitor everything you do and say.
And as the Aaron case proves, the two, three and four letter agencies have tons of resources they don't know what to do with, are looking to make examples of anyone who gets a following and wants to upset the status quo, so if you get picked up and identified by passive surveillance, you better be ready to be sent to the front line of WWIII.

On the upside,
the wrong side of the CJS is a great place to recruit soldiers :wink:

Edited by mSparks, 05 January 2015 - 09:43 AM.


#34 army_of_one

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Posted 05 January 2015 - 12:14 PM

Don't forget the easiest method to target people: financially. Wikileaks leveraged anonymity and INFOSEC techniques to protect their work. Hackers, governments, media types, businesses, and more wanted them gone. Took enormous resources and they fortunately had steady funding. Then, they were about to target a major bank in America like they did Julius Baer. Bank of America's net worth dropped by several billion in a day after that announcement given it was believed they were the target. The core banks, arguably the elites of the elites, showed their power: all reliable funding mechanisms to Wikileaks were cut. Visa, Mastercard, Paypal, and so on. Wikileaks then burned through money until it finally collapsed. The internal breakup didn't help.

 

The U.S. government can find ways to imprison you for not complying with their wishes. FBI can seize your machines before charging you. IRS can freeze your assets before charging you. U.S.P.S. can monitor or seize your mail (eg checks). Apparently, banks can cut off your funding as well. This doesn't even factor in CIA N.C.S. efforts like torture flights. Anyone creating a high assurance product that the NSA or FBI couldn't circumvent under any conditions could experience all of this. The Tor project has been lucky so far that they've rarely been a factor in stopping FBI or NSA from hitting their targets. Otherwise, they'd be next after Wikileaks.

 

Note: I'd love to talk to Tor lawyers to see how they avoid what companies like Lavabit and Google can't. Maybe the strategy could be copied.



#35 mSparks

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Posted 05 January 2015 - 01:16 PM

Don't forget the easiest method to target people: financially. Wikileaks leveraged anonymity and INFOSEC techniques to protect their work. Hackers, governments, media types, businesses, and more wanted them gone. Took enormous resources and they fortunately had steady funding. Then, they were about to target a major bank in America like they did Julius Baer. Bank of America's net worth dropped by several billion in a day after that announcement given it was believed they were the target. The core banks, arguably the elites of the elites, showed their power: all reliable funding mechanisms to Wikileaks were cut. Visa, Mastercard, Paypal, and so on. Wikileaks then burned through money until it finally collapsed. The internal breakup didn't help.

The U.S. government can find ways to imprison you for not complying with their wishes. FBI can seize your machines before charging you. IRS can freeze your assets before charging you. U.S.P.S. can monitor or seize your mail (eg checks). Apparently, banks can cut off your funding as well. This doesn't even factor in CIA N.C.S. efforts like torture flights. Anyone creating a high assurance product that the NSA or FBI couldn't circumvent under any conditions could experience all of this. The Tor project has been lucky so far that they've rarely been a factor in stopping FBI or NSA from hitting their targets. Otherwise, they'd be next after Wikileaks.

Note: I'd love to talk to Tor lawyers to see how they avoid what companies like Lavabit and Google can't. Maybe the strategy could be copied.

But now we have a whole army of crypto currencies, they don't even have the ability to seize assets or funds anymore.

Erm, wikileaks didn't "break up" afaik, although the last leak was 21st December 2014

Today, 21 December 2014, WikiLeaks releases two classified documents by a previously undisclosed CIA office detailing how to maintain cover while travelling through airports using false ID – including during operations to infiltrate the European Union and the Schengen passport control system. This is the second release within WikiLeaks' CIA Series, which will continue in the new year.



Tor is a different story, in that it has now replaced much of the SIPRNet functionality.

Edited by mSparks, 05 January 2015 - 01:22 PM.





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